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Abstract 
 
We investigate how the development of the credit default swap (CDS) market affects lenders’ 
incentives to initiate new lending relationships. We predict that CDSs reduce the adverse selection 
that non-relationship lenders face when competing for loans, by allowing those lenders to hedge 
loan exposure and by the revelation of private information through CDS spreads. We find that, 
following CDS initiation on a borrower’s debt, non-relationship lead arrangers are more likely to 
originate its loans and non-relationship participants are more likely to join loan syndicates. We 
also show that lead arrangers that initiate lending relationships following CDS initiation focus 
more on commercial aspects of lending relationship. These lead arrangers are more likely to pursue 
new borrowers with high cross-selling potential, which are expected to generate substantial fee 
business. Further, non-relationship lenders have lower incentives for costly borrower monitoring, 
as reflected in weaker control rights and in the lower loan share they retain. Relative to relationship 
lenders, non-relationship lenders are likely to be more distant from borrowers, foreign, and less 
reputable once CDSs become available, emphasizing their lower monitoring efficiency.     
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1. Introduction 
The development of the credit default swap (CDS) market is one of the most important 
financial innovations of recent decades. CDSs allow lenders to hedge borrowers’ credit risk while 
maintaining their lending relationships (e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013). However, CDS hedging 
reduces lenders’ incentives to monitor borrowers and may push borrowers into inefficient 
bankruptcy (e.g., Hu and Black 2008; Ashcraft and Santos 2009; Bolton and Oehmke 2011; 
Parlour and Winton 2013). Considering these positive and negative attributes, we examine how 
CDSs influence the loan origination and participation decisions in loan syndicates.  
We predict that non-relationship lenders (that is, lenders with no relationship with a given 
borrower before CDS initiation) are more likely to serve as lead arrangers or join loan syndicates 
as participants once CDSs on a borrower’s debt become available. Non-relationship lenders 
competing for a loan face adverse selection risk, as relationship lenders’ prior experience with the 
borrower gives them a substantial information advantage (Boot 2000). Because relationship 
lenders exploit this advantage and bid for good loans while avoiding bad ones, non-relationship 
lenders will compete less aggressively for a loan, which typically results in them losing it to a 
better-informed incumbent lender (Rajan 1992). But once CDSs become available, an opportunity 
to hedge against potential credit losses should significantly mitigate non-relationship lenders’ 
adverse selection concerns. CDS spreads also often reveal private information about a borrower 
through informed trading by relationship lenders, further diminishing non-relationship lenders’ 
information disadvantage (e.g., Acharya and Johnson 2007; Qiu and Yu 2012; Batta et al. 2016). 
We expect lower adverse selection to increase the willingness of non-relationship lenders to bid 
for a loan, thus increasing their probability of winning a deal. This reasoning applies to non-
relationship lenders competing with incumbent lead arrangers to serve as the lead arranger of a 
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loan as well as to non-relationship lenders competing to join the syndicate with other participants 
that have superior information about the borrower through prior lending. 
Using staggered initiation of CDS trading across CDS firms, we use a difference-in-
differences research design with firm and time fixed effects. We find a positive and significant 
effect of CDSs on non-relationship lending for both lead arrangers and syndicate participants. The 
probability that a non-relationship lead arranger (syndicate participant) arranges (joins) the loan 
syndicate is 1.39 (1.28) times higher following CDS trading initiation on a borrower’s debt. These 
findings are robust when we perform short-window analyses around CDS initiation, propensity-
score match CDS firms with non-CDS firms, and use the instrumental variable approach.  
To better understand the underlying mechanisms of non-relationship lending decisions 
following CDS initiation, we next explore whether non-relationship lenders are more likely to 
focus on commercial aspects of the lending relationship. Lending decisions are typically driven by 
the overall profitability of the relationship with the borrower, including non-interest income 
(Standard & Poor’s 2011). Lenders cross-sell various services, such as investment banking, 
derivatives, and structured finance, generally aiming to serve their borrowers as a “one-stop shop” 
for all financial services (Drucker and Puri 2005; Yasuda 2005; Fang et al. 2013). Because non-
relationship lenders initiate a lending relationship only after CDSs become available and are 
therefore likely to hedge their exposure, thus reducing concerns about borrower credit risk, we 
predict that they will pursue new borrowers with high cross-selling potential. Cross-sold products 
typically generate substantial fee revenues, enhancing the profitability of the new relationship, but 
impose only insignificant pressure on regulatory capital ratios. These fees will also help 
compensate for the cost of purchasing CDS protection, further reinforcing our predictions.1 
                                                
1 Substantial loan origination fees charged by lead arrangers further help them compensate for CDS hedging costs. 
Origination fees typically range from one to five percent of the total loan commitment, depending primarily on the 
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Because lenders’ expectations about borrowers’ future business needs are difficult to assess, 
we use multiple measures of cross-selling potential: (a) media coverage of a borrower’s activities, 
including public offerings, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and investments; (b) a borrower’s 
M&A after a loan’s issuance; (c) whether a borrower is in the aviation, shipbuilding, oil, refinery, 
gas, or telecommunication industries, which offer lenders opportunities to sell structured finance 
products; (d) a borrower’s use of derivatives; and (e) the extent of a borrower’s foreign operations, 
which captures transaction banking opportunities and related foreign-currency hedging. For all 
measures, we find that, following CDS initiation, lead arrangers are more likely to enter into new 
lending relationships if a borrower has high cross-selling potential. The likelihood of non-
relationship participants joining the syndicate is also enhanced by cross-selling potential, but to a 
lesser degree, which is likely explained by lead arrangers being the primary beneficiaries of those 
opportunities (e.g., Ivashina and Kovner 2011). 
We also expect the commercialization of the new lending relationships to be reflected in 
lenders’ weaker monitoring incentives. Non-relationship lenders that establish a relationship with 
the borrower following the onset of CDS trading should be more likely to rely on CDSs, rather 
than on borrower monitoring, to protect themselves against credit risk. Less intensive monitoring 
will allow these lenders to reduce monitoring costs, further enhancing the profitability of new 
relationships. Weak monitoring may also help a non-relationship lender attract new borrowers, as 
well as give these borrowers flexibility to pursue new business activities, which in turn will create 
additional cross-selling opportunities. Therefore, although prior studies show that CDSs diminish 
the strength of lender monitoring (e.g., Subrahmanyam et al. 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury 
2015), we predict this adverse effect to be stronger for non-relationship lenders. 
                                                
complexity of the transaction (Standard & Poor’s 2011). In 2017, loan origination fees amounted to $11.5 billion in 
the US syndicated loan market.  
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We base lender monitoring analyses on lead arrangers because they perform the primary 
monitoring of the borrowers on behalf of syndicate participants (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux 2004; 
Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009). We measure lead arrangers’ monitoring incentives by the strength of 
their control rights, since lenders retain stronger rights when they intend to monitor a borrower 
more intensively (Roberts and Sufi 2009a, 2009b; Roberts 2015). Loan contracts with a higher 
ratio of performance (income-statement-based) covenants to total financial covenants and those 
that incorporate interest-increasing performance-pricing provisions endow lenders with stronger 
control rights (Roberts and Sufi 2009a; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012; Christensen et al. 2016). 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that, following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead 
arrangers impose a lower ratio of performance covenants and are less likely to impose interest-
increasing provisions relative to relationship lead arrangers. Further, we show that, in contrast to 
non-relationship lead arrangers, relationship lead arrangers do not relinquish their control rights 
after CDS initiation. This evidence provides new insight into the previously documented negative 
effect of CDSs on lenders’ monitoring incentives (e.g., Chakraborty et al. 2015; Shan et al. 2015). 
We show that this effect stems primarily from lenders that initiate a relationship with the borrower 
after CDS initiation, while relationship lenders do not reduce their monitoring efforts.  
Lead arrangers also have stronger monitoring incentives when they have more skin in the 
game; that is, when they retain a larger loan share (e.g., Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009). Therefore, we 
predict that, following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead arrangers retain a smaller loan share 
relative to relationship lead arrangers. We find strong support for this prediction. Importantly, 
consistent with covenant and performance-provision tests, we show the opposing responses to 
CDS initiation by relationship and non-relationship lenders. Although prior research shows that 
lead arrangers retain larger loan share in the post-CDS period (e.g., Amiram et al. 2017), we find 
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that this effect is driven primarily by relationship lenders, while non-relationship lenders do not 
increase their skin in the game.  
We complement these analyses by exploring whether the characteristics of non-relationship 
lenders differ in the post- versus the pre-CDS initiation period. If CDS-protected non-relationship 
lead arrangers are less committed to monitoring, we predict that there is a higher likelihood that 
lead arrangers with lower monitoring efficiency will initiate relationships in the post period. 
Because greater distance to the borrower impedes a lender’s information gathering and increases 
monitoring costs, we measure monitoring efficiency by the distance between the lead arranger and 
the borrower and by whether the lead arranger is a foreign institution (e.g., Berger et al. 2005; 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald 2010). Following prior research, we also view 
reputable lead arrangers as having stronger monitoring ability (e.g., Sufi 2007; Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2012). We find that, relative to relationship lenders, non-relationship lenders 
are likely to be more distant from borrowers, foreign, and less reputable once CDSs become 
available, consistent with such lenders being less likely to engage in costly monitoring. 
We acknowledge that the stronger negative influence of CDSs on the monitoring of non-
relationship lead arrangers should negatively affect syndicate participants’ willingness to join the 
syndicates they arrange. Prior studies suggest that agency problems within a syndicate are 
mitigated if participants with prior relationships with the borrower join the syndicate, since they 
are more informed about the borrower’s performance and creditworthiness (e.g., Sufi 2007; 
Ivashina 2008). Thus, although we hypothesize and find that non-relationship participants are more 
likely to join the syndicate following CDS initiation, we predict that this effect will be attenuated 
if a non-relationship lead arranger syndicates a loan. We indeed find that, following CDS initiation, 
the probability that a non-relationship participant joins a syndicate is lower if the loan is arranged 
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by a non-relationship relative to a relationship lead arranger. 
We conduct additional exploratory tests of the effect of CDSs on non-relationship lending. 
To disrupt existing lending relationships, non-relationship lenders may entice borrowers with 
favorable loan terms, such as a low interest rate and large loan size. However, because hedging via 
CDSs is costly, more favorable terms may diminish the benefits of the new lending relationship. 
We find that, following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead arrangers do not charge lower 
spreads but do issue smaller loans, relative to relationship lead arrangers. Coupled with the 
significant impact of cross-selling potential on non-relationship lenders’ decisions, this evidence 
suggests that, even though these lenders provide new borrowers with less credit in order to reduce 
hedging costs, they still get a mandate to provide the borrowers with additional financial services.   
To shed additional light on lenders’ incentives to initiate new lending relationships following 
CDS initiation, we explore non-relationship lenders’ performance. Lenders often experience low 
loan growth due to internal credit risk-management restrictions or regulatory capital constraints. 
Since CDSs offer more flexible credit risk management and alleviate capital constraints, we predict 
that lenders with low loan growth are more likely to seek new borrowers after the onset of CDS 
trading. We also expect lenders with low profitability to have stronger incentives to initiate new 
relationships once they can hedge their exposure through CDSs, as these relationships may boost 
profitability by generating additional interest revenue and cross-selling fees. Consistent with these 
predictions, we find that low loan growth and profitability amplify the effect of CDSs on the 
probability of initiating new relationships for both lead arrangers and syndicate participants.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on the influence of the CDS market on private lending. 
Prior studies find a significant impact of CDSs both on borrowers’ access to credit and on the 
strength of lenders’ monitoring (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos 2009; Saretto and Tookes 2013; 
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Subrahmanyam et al. 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). These studies, however, mostly do 
not differentiate between existing and new lending relationships.2 We extend this literature by 
exploring how CDSs affect the formation and commercialization of new relationships. Further, we 
supplement prior studies that examine the underlying mechanisms through which CDSs affect 
lenders’ monitoring incentives, such as lead arrangers’ loan shares and control rights (e.g., 
Chakraborty et al. 2015; Shan et al. 2015; Amiram et al. 2017). We show that the influence of CDS 
trading on these mechanisms depends to a large extent on whether lenders had an established 
relationship with a borrower before CDS initiation.  
We also contribute to the large literature on relationship lending. While some studies show 
important benefits to borrowers from established lending relationships (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 
1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995; Brahrath et al. 2009), others emphasize its dark side, where 
borrowers become locked in a relationship due to the information advantage of incumbent lenders 
(e.g., Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). We provide evidence consistent with CDS trading fundamentally 
altering competition in the loan market by enhancing the willingness of non-relationship lenders 
to compete for new borrowers. Relatedly, our findings underscore important implications of 
financial innovation for the evolution of the lender-borrower relationship.  
                                                
2 In a concurrent paper, Shan et al. (2016) also document the higher likelihood of loans syndicated by non-relationship 
lead arrangers following CDS initiation. They attribute this finding to borrowers switching to new lead arrangers 
because their current borrower–lead-arranger relationship is compromised by CDSs and becomes less valuable to the 
borrower. In contrast, building on Rajan (1992), we suggest that CDSs decrease adverse selection between incumbent 
and non-relationship lenders, thus increasing the latter’s willingness to compete for new borrowers and consequently 
the likelihood of winning a loan deal. We also focus on the commercialization of the new lending relationship in the 
post-CDS period, as reflected by non-relationship lenders pursuing borrowers with higher cross-selling potential and 
by their weaker monitoring incentives, which Shan et al. (2016) do not explore. Note, too, that our findings with 
respect to non-relationship lead arrangers’ monitoring incentives further undermine Shan et al.’s (2016) motivation. 
They argue that borrowers switch away from relationship lenders primarily because they are concerned about these 
lenders’ weaker monitoring incentives. In contrast, we show that relationship lenders actually do not relinquish their 
control rights and do increase their “skin in the game” following CDS initiation, while non-relationship lenders 
monitor substantially less intensively than relationship lenders.  
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Finally, we add to the growing literature on the importance of noncredit revenue sources in 
private lending. Prior studies show that lenders gain future underwriting of a borrower’s bonds and 
equity (e.g., Drucker and Puri 2005; Yasuda 2005). There is also evidence that lenders price into 
the loan spread a borrower’s cross-selling potential as well as its board network, as this network 
offers an advantage in cross-selling services to other firms (e.g., Ivashina and Kovner 2011; Zhao 
2017). We complement these studies by showing that a borrower’s cross-selling potential is 
instrumental in lenders’ decisions to initiate new relationships. We also show that CDS protection 
leads to the substantial commercialization of these relationships.   
The next section presents hypothesis development. Section 3 describes data and sample 
selection. Section 4 reports our findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 CDS trading and non-relationship lending in the syndicated loan market 
The introduction of CDSs significantly influenced the private debt market by offering banks 
hedging opportunities to lay off borrowers’ credit risk, while maintaining lending relationships 
(e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013). Even if lenders do not hedge their loan exposure at loan initiation, 
the existence of CDSs offers them a liquid resale option and thus increases their willingness to 
extend credit. Further, CDSs allow lenders more flexible risk management and provide them an 
opportunity to reduce regulatory capital requirements by substituting the risk weight of the CDS 
counterparty (typically, a large financial institution) for that of the borrower (Saretto and Tookes 
2013; Streitz 2015; Martin and Roychowdhury 2015; Shan et al. 2016).  
Yet CDSs also induce empty creditor problems as CDS-protected lenders become 
intransigent in debt renegotiation or even push borrowers into inefficient liquidation (Hu and Black 
2008; Bolton and Oehmke 2011). CDSs reduce lenders’ monitoring incentives because hedging 
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their loan exposure may be less costly alternative to protect themselves against default risk than 
intensive information collection and monitoring. Consistent with weaker monitoring, prior studies 
find that, following CDS initiation, the cost of debt increases for risky and informationally opaque 
borrowers, borrowers experience more credit rating downgrades and bankruptcies and report less 
conservatively, and lenders impose looser financial covenants and weaker restrictions after 
covenant violations (Ashcraft and Santos 2009; Subrahmanyam et al. 2014; Martin and 
Roychowdhury 2015; Chakraborty et al. 2015; Shan et al. 2015). Amiram et al. (2017) show that 
syndicate participants, who largely delegate monitoring to the lead arranger, require the arranger 
to have more skin in the game to compensate for the reduction in its monitoring incentives after 
the initiation of CDS trading. 
We extend these studies by examining how the availability of CDSs affects the likelihood of 
lenders without a prior relationship with the borrower serving as the lead arranger or joining its 
loan syndicate as a participant. Because relationship lenders have an information advantage, due 
to their extensive knowledge of a borrower’s operations and creditworthiness, non-relationship 
lenders competing for a borrowers’ loans face substantial adverse selection risk (Boot 2000). This 
typically results in a non-relationship lender losing competition for a borrower’s loan to a better-
informed incumbent lender. Specifically, Rajan (1992) shows that relationship lenders exploit their 
information advantage and bid for good loans while avoiding bad ones. Because relationship 
lenders avoid bad loans, non-relationship lenders face significant losses if they do bid. As a result, 
non-relationship lenders, being aware of the adverse selection problem, compete less aggressively, 
which reduces the probability that they win the loan.  
The availability of CDSs on a borrower’s debt mitigates adverse selection risk that non-
relationship lenders face because it allows them to hedge loan exposure, thus assuaging their 
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concerns regarding potential credit losses when initiating a new relationship. CDS spreads also 
often reveal private information about a borrower, ahead of public disclosures and price discovery 
in other markets, largely due to insider trading of relationship lenders (e.g., The Financial Times 
2005; Acharya and Johnson 2007; Qiu and Yu, 2013; Batta 2016). The revelation of a substantial 
private information through CDSs should mitigate non-relationship lenders’ information 
disadvantage, further alleviating their adverse selection concerns.  
This reasoning applies to lead arrangers as well as syndicate participants. Relationship 
lenders and non-relationship lenders compete to serve as the lead arranger on a borrower’s loan. 
Lower adverse selection, due to CDS availability, is expected to increase non-relationship lead 
arrangers’ willingness to compete for a borrower’s loan, increasing the probability of their winning 
the deal (Rajan 1992). Similarly, lenders compete to join syndicates. Syndication represents an 
auction in which loan participants submit sealed bids to the lead arranger, and the number of 
invitations extended to potential participants typically exceeds the number of lenders who will 
fund the loan (Champagne and Kryzanowski 2007; Ivashina and Sun 2011). Lenders with superior 
information about the borrower, because of prior lending relationships, are likely to pursue 
participation in good loans, leaving bad ones to non-relationship participants. We expect lower 
adverse selection, due to CDS hedging and the revelation of private information through CDS 
spreads, to increase the willingness of non-relationship lenders to bid for loan participation. 
Building on these argument, we state our first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: The probability that a non-relationship lead arranger (syndicate participant) arranges 
(joins) the loan syndicate is higher following the initiation of CDS trading on a borrower’s debt.  
 
2.2 The Commercialization of New Lending Relationships  
We next investigate whether a borrower’s cross-selling potential intensifies the effect of CDS 
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trading on non-relationship lending in the syndicated loan market. Lenders invest in loans for more 
than just the interest income; they consider the overall profitability of the relationship, including 
noncredit revenue (Standard & Poor’s 2011). In particular, lenders typically adopt a portfolio-
management approach, in which they allocate capital to borrowers based on the total return 
generated by a relationship, relative to its risk.  
Lenders cross-sell various services, including investment banking, derivatives, and 
structured finance. Drucker and Puri (2005) and Yasuda (2005) show that serving as a lead arranger 
helps a bank gain future underwriting of a borrower’s bonds and equity. Ivashina and Kovner 
(2011) also show that lenders account for cross-selling potential when pricing leveraged buyout 
loans. Fang et al. (2013) provide evidence consistent with banks aiming to serve their borrowers 
as “one-stop shop” for financial services.  
Because non-relationship lenders initiate lending relationship only once CDSs become 
available, they are likely to hedge their exposure, thus diminishing concerns about a borrower’s 
credit risk. Thus, we expect CDS-protected non-relationship lenders to focus more on commercial 
aspects of the lending relationship. We predict that these lenders will pursue new borrowers with 
high cross-selling potential.  Cross-sold products are mostly fee-based and entail minimal risk-
weighted assets. Therefore, cross-selling will generate substantial fee revenues for the lender, 
while imposing only insignificant pressure on regulatory capital ratios. Fees generated by cross-
selling will also help compensate for the cost of purchasing CDS protection. Note that, although 
non-relationship lenders would have benefited from a lending relationship with high cross-selling 
potential borrower even before CDS initiation on the borrower’s debt, they were reluctant to 
initiate such relationships, likely due to the high adverse selection they faced without credit 
protection via CDS. We therefore hypothesize:  
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H2: The increase in the probability that a non-relationship lead arranger (syndicate 
participant) arranges (joins) the loan syndicate following the initiation of CDS trading on a 
borrower’s debt is higher when the borrower has high cross-selling potential.   
 
We also expect that the commercialization of the lending relationships initiated following 
the onset of CDS trading leads to the reduction in lender monitoring incentives. Prior studies 
already document that CDSs undercut lenders’ monitoring incentives (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos 
2009; Subrahmanyam et al. 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury 2015; Amiram et al. 2017), but we 
predict that this effect is stronger for non-relationship lenders. Because non-relationship arrangers 
initiate new relationships with the borrowers only once CDSs become available, they are more 
likely to purchase CDS protection than to engage in intense borrower monitoring to address credit 
risk concerns. Lenders will bear lower monitoring costs with weaker borrower monitoring, thus 
boosting the profitability of new relationships. Moreover, monitoring less intensively may help 
non-relationship lead arrangers attract new borrowers, as borrowers prefer fewer constraints on 
their actions (e.g., Berlin and Mester 1992; Bradley and Roberts 2015). Allowing borrowers 
greater flexibility to engage in new business activities should also create additional cross-selling 
opportunities, further benefiting non-relationship lenders. Because it is lead arrangers that assume 
the primary monitoring responsibilities on behalf of syndicate participants and negotiate loan terms 
with the borrower (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009), we focus our third 
hypothesis on the lead arrangers of syndicates:           
H3: Following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead arrangers have weaker monitoring 
incentives, relative to relationship lead arrangers.    
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3. Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data sources and sample selection 
We obtain syndicated loan characteristics from DealScan and CDS data from Markit. 
Borrowers’ characteristics are from Compustat and CRSP, and banks’ characteristics are from Call 
Reports (Form Y-9C regulatory filings). We collect firm credit ratings from Compustat and 
Mergent FISD, data on analyst coverage from I/B/E/S, data on media articles from RavenPack 
News Analytics, and data on mergers and acquisitions from SDC.  
We start sample selection with all syndicated loans issued from 1994 to 2015, as reported in 
DealScan. There are 46,061 loan packages (deals) issued to US firms over this period. We match 
this sample to Compustat and eliminate observations with insufficient loan and firm data, resulting 
in 29,559 loan packages, issued to 6,956 firms. We match this sample to Markit and identify firms 
with traded CDSs at any point over our sample period (CDS firms hereafter). Following prior 
literature (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos 2009; Amiram et al. 2017), we identify the date of CDS trading 
initiation as the first date when a CDS quote for a firm is provided by Markit.3 In line with Amiram 
et al. (2017), we eliminate firms for which the first CDS trade date falls in January 2001, the first 
month of Markit’s coverage, because of the ambiguity of the exact date of initiation for these firms. 
We also require each CDS firm to have at least one loan issued in both the pre- and post-CDS 
initiation periods and non-CDS firms to have at least one loan issued starting in 2001, when CDS 
firms in our sample begin to have traded CDSs. Our final sample contains 843 CDS firms and 
2,814 non-CDS firms, corresponding to 23,316 loan packages. This process yields 27,547 
(177,936) arranger-loan (participant-loan) observations. 
 
                                                
3 Our main findings are unchanged when we identify CDS initiation date as the first date when the quote for a five-
year USD-denominated CDS contract is provided by Markit, following Ashcraft and Santos (2009). These contracts 
are the most commonly traded in the CDS market.   
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our test. The mean value 
of No Relationship - Lead Arranger indicates that 38% of lead arrangers in our sample do not have 
a prior relationship with the borrower. For lead arrangers that syndicate loans to CDS firms 
following CDS initiation, we define the No Relationship - Lead Arranger indicator variable to be 
equal to 1 if the lead arranger has not syndicated a borrower’s loans before the CDS initiation date 
and 0 otherwise. For lead arrangers that syndicate loans to CDS firms prior to CDS initiation or to 
non-CDS firms, we define No Relationship - Lead Arranger to be equal to 1 if the lead arranger 
has not syndicated a borrower’s loans before the issuance date of the loan under consideration and 
0 otherwise. The mean value of No Relationship - Participant indicates that 44% of syndicate 
participants in our sample do not have prior relationships with the borrower. For syndicate 
participants in loans to CDS firms following CDS initiation, we define the No Relationship - 
Participant indicator variable to be equal to 1 if the participant has not participated in a borrower’s 
loans before the CDS initiation date and 0 otherwise. For participants in loans to CDS firms prior 
to CDS initiation or to non-CDS firms, we define No Relationship - Participant to be equal to 1 if 
the participant has not participated in a borrower’s loans before the issuance date of the loan under 
consideration and 0 otherwise.4   
For both the lead arranger and participant samples, the firms are relatively large, as reflected 
by the mean values of Assets, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets (detailed variable 
definitions are reported in Appendix A). The average ratio of net income to total assets (ROA) is 
                                                
4 We acknowledge that defining No Relationship based on the CDS initiation date for CDS firm and based on loan 
issuance date for non-CDS firms may raise a concern about the validity of our findings. In Section 4.2, we use 
difference-in-differences approach, where we assign a pseudo-CDS initiation date to the matched non-CDS firms 
using the initiation date of the paired CDS firms. This allows us to measure No Relationship over the same period for 
each pair of CDS and matched non-CDS firms.  
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0.03 for both samples, and 21% (16%) of sample observations relate to firms experiencing losses 
(Loss) for the lead arranger (participant) samples. The mean leverage ratio (Leverage), measured 
by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, is 0.64 (0.66), and the average interest coverage ratio 
(Interest coverage), measured as EBIT divided by the interest expense, is 11.02 (9.65), while mean 
asset tangibility (Tangibility), measured as property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets, 
is 0.60 (0.59) for the lead arranger (participant) sample. In addition, 58% (72%) of the lead arranger 
(participant) sample observations relate to borrowers that are rated (Rated) and 33% (42%) to 
borrowers with investment-grade ratings (Investment Grade). We also report statistics for loan 
characteristics that serve as controls. For both samples, the mean and median value of loan size 
(Amount), measured by natural logarithm of the loan amount, suggest that sample observations 
relate to loans that are relatively large (Amount), have an average maturity (Maturity) of 
approximately four years, and are subject to less than two financial covenants (#Covenants). A 
majority of observations are characterized by performance pricing provisions (PP), and 10% 
(11%) of them have a loan guarantor (Guarantor) for the lead arranger (participant) sample.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The effect of CDS Trading on Non-Relationship Lending 
To examine our first hypothesis that lenders are more likely to issue loans to a new borrower 
following the CDS trading initiation on the borrower’s debt, we estimate the following logit model. 
No Relationship = β 0 + β1POST + β2Assets + β3ROA + β4Loss + β5Leverage  
+ β6Interest Coverage + β7Tangibility + β8Rated  
+ β9Investment Grade + β10Amount + β11Maturity + β12Guarantor 
+  γFixed Effects + ε,                                                                            
 
 
 
(1)
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where No Relationship is one of the two indicator variables — No Relationship-Lead Arranger 
and No Relationship-Participant — defined as previously. Our main variable of interest is the 
POST indicator variable, which equals to 1 if the loan is issued after the CDS trading initiation 
date and 0 otherwise (this variable takes the value of 0 for all loans to non-CDS firms). If non-
relationship lending increases after CDS trading initiation on a borrower’s debt, we expect a 
positive and significant coefficient on POST.  
We control for firm and loan characteristics that can affect lenders’ decisions to initiate new 
lending relationships, including a firm’s size, profitability, the incidence of losses, interest 
coverage, tangibility and credit rating characteristics, as well as loan size, maturity and whether a 
loan has a guarantor. All firm characteristics are defined as previously and measured in the year 
preceding a loan’s issuance. For loan packages that contain more than one loan (facility), we follow 
Ball et al. (2008) and Ivashina (2009) and use characteristics of the largest one. Our findings are 
unchanged when we control for the weighted-average loan characteristics of all loans in the 
package, where weights are based on loan (facility) size (untabulated).5   
To aid identification strategy, we include in Model (1) firm and year fixed effects, allowing 
us to implement a difference-in-differences research design, because CDS initiation dates are 
staggered across CDS firms. Firm fixed effects control for the time-invariant differences between 
CDS and non-CDS firms, while year fixed effects control for the time-varying factors common to 
all sample firms (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Sapienza 2002; Valta 2012; Amiram et al. 
2017).6 We acknowledge that, because firms may issue loans in months both before and after the 
                                                
5 We do not control for the number of covenants and performance pricing provisions, as these characteristics are 
typically determined during the loan negotiation and therefore cannot affect lenders’ choice of whether to start a new 
lending relationship. In any case, in untabulated analyses, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these 
variables.  
6 In section 4.2 below, we propensity-score match CDS firm to non-CDS firm, which allows us to assign the CDS 
initiation date to each matched non-CDS firm. Our results are robust to this standard difference-in-difference approach.  
17 
 
initiation date during the CDS initiation year, employing year-month fixed effects is a better 
strategy to identify initiation effects. Due to concerns regarding a large number of fixed effects in 
nonlinear models (e.g., Maddalla 1987; Greene 2004), as an additional specification, we estimate 
Model 1 with a linear probability model, where we substitute year fixed effects with year-month 
fixed effects. Moreover, as many of our subsequent analyses incorporate interaction terms, linear 
probability estimations also mitigate concerns regarding the interpretation of interaction terms in 
our nonlinear model estimations (e.g., Norton et al., 2004). To correct for within-firm correlation 
in the error term, we cluster standard errors at the firm level.  
We present our findings in Panel A of Table 2. In columns 1 and 2, we report the estimation 
of Model (1) employing Logit and OLS models, respectively, for the lead arranger sample. We 
find a positive and significant coefficient on POST for both Logit and OLS specifications. 
Economically, based on the OLS specification, the probability that a non-relationship lead arranger 
syndicates the loan is 1.39 times higher following the CDS trading initiation (note that we measure 
economic significance based on the OLS specification for all tests). We find similar results for 
syndicate participants, as reported in columns 3 and 4. The probability that a participant with no 
relationship with the borrower joins the syndicate is 1.28 times higher once CDSs become 
available. These results are consistent with our primary prediction that lenders are more likely to 
initiate a new lending relationship after the inception of CDSs referencing the borrower’s debt.7  
With respect to controls, the negative and significant coefficient on Leverage suggests that 
higher leverage deters non-relationship lenders. The positive and significant coefficient on 
Tangible for the lead arranger sample implies that higher asset tangibility attracts non-relationship 
arrangers. When borrowers issue longer maturity loans and those with guarantors, we find that it 
                                                
7 In untabulated analyses, we find that the effect of CDS trading on non-relationship lending is more pronounced for 
lead arrangers than syndicate participants. 
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is more likely for these loans to be arranged by non-relationship lenders.  
One concern that might arise when using our difference-in-differences research design is 
whether the parallel trend assumption holds. To address it, we augment Model (1) with an indicator 
variable Last Loan, which is equal to 1 for the last loan issued before the CDS initiation date and 
0 otherwise. If there exists a pre-tend of non-relationship lending before CDS initiation, we expect 
to find a higher likelihood of non-relationship lending for the last loan before initiation (Heider 
and Ljungqvist 2015; Amiram et al. 2017). As we report in Panel B, the coefficients on Last Loan 
are insignificant and negative across all model specifications, indicating that the likelihood of non-
relationship lending is not higher for the last loan before CDS initiation date relative to the loans 
preceding this loan. This evidence suggests that the parallel trend assumption holds in our tests.  
To further verify the robustness of our findings, we repeat our analyses using a short-window 
sample that limits observations of CDS firms to three years before and after CDS initiation. These 
analyses mitigate concerns that factors other than CDS initiation could drive our results. We report 
these tests in Panel C. Consistent with our main findings, the coefficients on POST is positive and 
significant for all lead arranger and participant specifications.  
We provide additional support for our inferences by examining how the effect of CDSs on 
non-relationship lending varies with a borrower’s information opacity. We expect hedging through 
CDSs and private information revealed by CDS spreads to be more valuable for non-relationship 
lenders when they lend to opaque firms, as adverse selection costs significantly increase with a 
borrower’s opacity.  To measure information opacity, we rely on a borrower’s analyst coverage, 
which is helpful for lenders in assessing borrower creditworthiness (Güntay and Hackbarth 2010; 
Mansi et al., 2011). Low Coverage is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of equity analyst 
following the borrower is below the sample median in a year of a loan’s issuance and 0 otherwise. 
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We augment model (1) with Low Coverage and the interaction term POST × Low Coverage. As 
we report in Appendix B, Table B1, the coefficient on POST × Low Coverage is positive and 
significant for the lead arranger specifications, suggesting that the effect of CDSs on the likelihood 
of a non-relationship lead arranger syndicating a loan is more pronounced for opaque borrowers. 
Following CDS initiation, lead arrangers are 1.21 times more likely to initiate a new lending 
relationship with opaque borrowers relative to more transparent borrowers. 8  However, the 
coefficient on POST × Low Coverage is positive but insignificant for the participant specifications. 
This evidence suggests that, because lead arrangers perform the primary screening and monitoring 
of the borrower, they are likely to incur higher adverse selection costs when initiating a new 
relationship with an opaque firm. 
 
4.2 Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
Although Model (1) includes firm and time fixed effects, we next employ PSM and IV 
approaches to further assuage endogeniety concerns associated with fundamental differences 
between CDS and non-CDS firms. To construct a matched sample of CDS and non-CDS firms for 
PSM analysis, we employ the CDS initiation model following Martin and Roychowdhury (2015). 
CDS Initiation = β0 + β1Rated + β2Investment Grade + β3Assets + β4Leverage   
+ β5Profit Margin + β6Return Volatility + β7MTB + ε, 
 
(2)
where CDS Initiation is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the year of CDS initiation and 0 
                                                
8 Although our findings with respect to the coefficient on the POST × Low Coverage interaction term are consistent 
across Logit and OLS specifications, to further address the concern regarding the interpretation of interaction terms 
in non-linear models, we apply Buis’ (2010) methodology. We continue to find positive and significant coefficient on 
POST × Low Coverage (untabulated). We perform this robustness test for all other analyses that include interaction 
terms in non-linear models. We find that the direction and economic significance of coefficients on interaction terms 
remains the same as in non-linear model estimations that we tabulate.   
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otherwise. Rated, Investment Grade, Assets, and Leverage are as previously defined. Profit Margin 
is net income divided by sales. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the firms’ monthly 
stock return over the year. MTB is the market value divided by the book value of equity. All 
variables are measured in the year before the year under consideration. We tabulate the estimation 
results of the first stage PSM model in Appendix B, Table B2, Panel A. In line with prior studies 
(Martin and Roychowdhury 2015; Kim et al. 2018), we find that the probability of CDS initiation 
is higher when a firm is rated, has an investment grade rating, and is larger. This probability is 
lower when a firm is more profitable.  
Using the propensity score (“predicted probability of CDS initiation”) estimated by the first-
stage PSM model (2), we construct the one-to-one matched PSM sample by selecting for each 
CDS firm a non-CDS firm having the closest propensity score. The matched sample enables us to 
employ a standard difference-in-difference research design, because we can assign a pseudo-CDS 
initiation date to the matched non-CDS firms using the initiation date of the paired CDS firms. We 
allow non-CDS firms to be matched to multiple CDS firms to improve covariate balancing and 
retain sample size (e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013). Our final sample contains 719 CDS firms and 
395 matched non-CDS firms (referring to 161,831 lender-loan observations). We tabulate the 
results of the covariate balancing analyses in Panel B of Table B2. These analyses suggest that the 
PSM matched samples are well balanced across the covariates for most CDS initiation 
determinants. The CDS firms are larger than matched non-CDS firms at the 10% significance 
level, but, economically, the difference in firm size is relatively small, given the absolute firm size 
of the matched CDS and non-CDS firms (mean assets for CDS (non-CDS) firms are USD 4,447 
million (USD 3,944 million).  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimation results based on the PSM sample. We augment 
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Model (1) with POST × CDS Traded interaction term, where CDS Traded is equal to 1 for CDS 
firms and 0 for non-CDS firms (the CDS Traded indicator variable is subsumed by firm fixed 
effects). The coefficient on POST × CDS Traded is a difference-in-differences estimator and is 
expected to be positive. Consistently, we find positive and significant coefficients on POST × CDS 
Traded for both lead arranger and syndicate participant specifications, supporting our main 
hypothesis that non-relationship lenders are more likely to extend loans to new borrowers once 
CDSs become available. Economically, a lead arranger (participant) is 1.17 (1.13) times more 
likely to initiate non-relationship lending following CDS initiation. To further examine the 
robustness of our findings, we conduct PSM analysis for a short-window sample that limits 
observations to three years before and after CDS initiation date (pseudo-initiation date for non-
CDS firms). The results presented in Panel B corroborate our prior findings: coefficients on POST 
× CDS Traded are significantly positive in all specifications.  
In addition to addressing endogeneity, the analyses in Table 3 mitigate concerns regarding 
the measurement of non-relationship lending for CDS and non-CDS firms in our primary tests. 
While for loans of CDS firm issued following CDS initiation we measure lending relationship 
relative to the CDS initiation date, because this date cannot be defined for non-CDS firms, we 
define non-relationship lending for these firms based on whether a lender had a relationship with 
the firm before the current loan’s issuance date. By assigning a pseudo-CDS initiation date to non-
CDS firms, a standard difference-in-differences approach allows us to measure non-relationship 
lending over the same period for each pair of CDS and matched non-CDS firms.  
Next, we perform additional analysis based on the IV approach to further address 
endogeneity concerns. Following prior literature, we use lenders’ foreign exchange (FX) derivative 
position as an instrument for CDS trading (e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013; Subrahmanyam et al. 
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2014; Shan et al. 2015; Amiram et al. 2017). Because banks that hedge one component of their 
portfolio are more likely to hedge others (e.g., Minton et al. 2009), we expect banks that hedge 
foreign exchange risk to also hedge credit risk via CDSs. Further, lenders’ FX derivatives position 
is a macro, rather than a firm-specific, hedge (e.g., Saretto and Tookes 2013). Thus, while related 
to a bank’s general propensity to hedge, the decision to hedge foreign exchange should be 
exogenous to a decision to start a lending relationship with a particular borrower.  
To construct the Forex instrument, we collect notional amounts of FX derivatives from Call 
Reports filed by bank holding companies. For banks with available data, Forex is defined as the 
ratio of notional amounts of FX derivatives to total assets. We augment CDS initiation model (2) 
with Forex and present, in Panel C, the results of the second-stage IV regression estimated 
simultaneously with the first-stage CDS initiation model. For both specifications, the coefficients 
on Post are positive and significant. Although we cannot be certain that the Forex instrument is 
truly exogenous, the results of IV tests confirm that lead arrangers and participants are more likely 
to enter into a new lending relationship when CDSs are available on the borrower’s debt.9  
 
4.3 Borrower Cross-Selling Potential 
In this section, we examine whether non-relationship lenders are more likely to pursue 
borrowers with higher cross-selling potential once CDSs become available. These analyses will 
help illuminate whether CDS-protected lenders pursue commercial aspects of the lending 
relationship when they initiate a new relationship. Since lenders’ expectations about borrowers’ 
future business needs are not directly observable, we employ multiple measures of high cross-
                                                
9  Due to Stata computational limitations, we cannot estimate the second-stage IV regression simultaneously with the 
first-stage model (2) when the second stage is estimated as the non-liner model with firm and year fixed effects or an 
OLS model with firm and month-year fixed effects. Therefore, to perform IV tests, we estimate the second-stage 
model as OLS with firm and year fixed effects.  
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selling potential to test our prediction.  
Our first measure of cross-selling potential is based on the media coverage of borrowers’ 
business activities, as media is an important information source to non-relationship lenders 
(Bushman et al. 2016). We consider media articles that cover topics such as “public offering,” 
“merger,” “acquisition,” and “investment” to relate to cross-selling opportunities. We focus on 
these topics because lenders benefit from cross-selling security underwriting and M&A advisory 
services, and receive significant originating fees if they syndicate loans to finance future 
investments of the borrower (e.g., Drucker and Puri 2005; Yasuda 2005; Ivashina and Kovner 
2011; Fang et al. 2013; Euromoney 2014). Our discussions with loan officers at several banks 
suggest that lenders continuously monitor information in the media to gather information about 
borrowers’ projected business activities and recent events, as these events may also indicate future 
business opportunities. Therefore, we consider media articles to be related to a borrower’s cross-
selling potential if they cover both past and expected borrower activities.  
For each borrower in our sample, we obtain media articles from Ravenpack, which covers 
all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires. We limit media data to full-size articles with a 
relevance score of 75 and above. The relevance score is assigned by RavenPack to indicate when 
the firm is strongly related to the underlying news story (the scores range from 0 (low relevance) 
to 100 (high relevance)). We identify articles as cross-selling related if their news type, as assigned 
by Ravenpack, is public offering, merger, acquisition, or investment. We define the High CS 
Potential-Media indicator variable as equal to 1 if media articles about a borrower cover cross-
selling related topics within three years before a loan’s issuance date and 0 otherwise. We then 
augment Model (1) with High CS Potential-Media and the interaction term POST × High CS 
Potential-Media. Panel A of Table 4 presents our findings (we restrict these analyses to the post-
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2000 period because of Ravenpack’s data availability). Consistent with our prediction that 
following CDS initiation lead arrangers are more likely to enter into a new lending relationships if 
a borrower has higher cross-selling potential, we find the positive and significant coefficient on 
POST × High CS Potential-Media for the arranger specifications. Economically, non-relationship 
arrangers are 1.12 times more likely to syndicate loans to new borrowers with media coverage of 
cross-selling opportunities relative to borrowers without such coverage. The coefficient on POST 
× High CS Potential-Media is insignificant in participant specifications. This finding is likely to 
be explained by lead arrangers being the primary beneficiaries of cross-selling opportunities (e.g., 
Ivashina and Kovner 2011), as they maintain the direct relationship with the borrower.  
Because M&A is a major line of business for investment banks, which offers lucrative 
business opportunities, such as M&A advisory and related financial services (Liaw 2011), our 
second measure of cross-selling potential further addresses a borrower’s M&A activity. Although 
our media-based cross-selling potential measure reflects publicly available information about these 
deals, lenders’ may also have private information concerning a borrower’s future M&A 
transactions. Because we cannot capture lender’s private information, we focus on actual M&A 
deals that occurred after loan issuance.  
We define the High CS Potential-M&A indicator variable to be equal to 1 if a borrower 
engages in M&A deals within three years following a loan’s issuance date and 0 otherwise. We 
then augment Model (1) with High CS Potential-M&A and the interaction term POST × High CS 
Potential-M&A. We report the results in Panel B of Table 4. Similar to our findings in Panel A, 
the coefficient on POST × High CS Potential-M&A is positive and significant for the lead arranger 
specifications. Economically, following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead arrangers are 1.23 
times more likely to issue loans to new borrowers with M&A business opportunities relative to 
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borrowers without such opportunities. We do not find that cross-selling potential influences 
whether non-relationship syndicate participants join the syndicate.  
Our third measure of high cross-selling potential is based on a borrower’s industry, as certain 
industries offer unique opportunities related to structured finance. In particular, the aviation, 
shipbuilding, oil, refinery and gas, and telecom industries offer banks such opportunities, which 
have higher fees/margins and lower risk due to high asset collateralization (Oliver Wyman 2006). 
Lenders also enjoy additional cross-selling benefits by selling to borrowers in these industries 
related derivatives products, such as commodity derivatives (especially for oil, gas, and natural 
resources), interest rate derivatives, and foreign-currency derivatives. We define the industry-
based measure of cross-selling potential — High CS Potential-Industry —  to be equal to 1 if a 
borrower is in one of the listed industries and 0 otherwise.10 As we report in Panel C,  the 
coefficient on the interaction term POST × High CS Potential-Industry is positive and significant 
for the lead arranger specifications, but  is insignificant for the participant specifications (note that 
High CS Potential-Industry indicator is subsumed by firm fixed effects). Following CDS initiation, 
lead arrangers are 1.23 times more likely to start a new lending relationship with borrowers in 
industries with high cross-selling opportunities relative to borrowers in other industries. These 
findings reinforce our inference that, post CDS initiation, non-relationship lead arrangers are more 
likely to initiate lending relationship with borrowers that offer high cross-selling opportunities.  
Our fourth measure of cross-selling potential is based on borrowers’ use of derivative-
related products, which also provide lenders with lucrative cross-selling business (e.g., Oliver 
Wyman 2006; Euromoney 2014). Derivative transactions offer high margins, as lenders charge 
borrowers significant fees while entering into offsetting positions with other counterparties, which 
                                                
10 We report in Appendix B, Table B3, four-digit SIC codes we used to classify these industries.  
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are typically less expensive than what borrowers are charged. Furthermore, derivative positions 
translate into lower risk-weighted assets, as actual exposures are much smaller than the notional 
amounts, allowing lenders to reserve less capital for these transactions (e.g., Neilson et al. 2017). 
To proxy for borrower future derivative needs, we presume that borrowers with high demand for 
derivatives products are likely to have more derivative-related words in their 10-K filings. We 
define the High CS Potential-Derivatives variable to be equal to 1 if the ratio of derivative-related 
word counts (e.g., “derivative,” “hedging”) to total words count in the 10-K filing in the year 
preceding a loan’s issuance is greater (less) than the sample median and zero otherwise. We find 
that the coefficient on POST × High CS Potential-Derivatives is positive and significant for both 
lead arrangers and participant specifications. Post CDS initiation, lead arrangers (participants) are 
1.14 (1.12) times more likely to initiate lending relationships with borrowers having higher 
demand for derivative products relative to other borrowers (Panel D).  
Our final measure of cross-selling potential addresses the extent of a borrower’s foreign 
operations. Foreign operations provide lenders with transaction banking opportunities (e.g., trade 
finance) as well as related foreign-currency hedging demand from borrowers. We measure the 
extent of foreign operations by an indicator variable High CS Potential-Foreign, which is equal to 
1 if the ratio of a number of a borrower’s foreign operating segments to its total number of 
operating segments in the year preceding a loan’s issuance is greater than the sample median and 
zero otherwise. As we report in Panel E, the coefficient on POST × High CS Potential-Foreign is 
positive and significant for all specifications. Following CDS initiation, lead arrangers 
(participants) are 1.15 (1.08) times more likely to initiate a new lending relationship with 
borrowers having more extensive foreign operations relative to other borrowers.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 4 suggest that once CDSs become available lead 
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arrangers and syndicate participants pursue new borrowers with high cross-selling potential, 
consistent with their focus on commercial aspects of new lending relationships. Our findings also 
imply that, while lead arrangers are likely to be the primary beneficiaries from cross-selling of 
security underwriting, M&A advisory, and structured finance products, participants may also 
enjoy some cross-selling opportunities, such as derivative and foreign operation transactions.  
 
4.4 Lenders’ Monitoring Incentives  
We next examine our prediction that the commercialization of the lending relationships leads 
to lower monitoring incentives of non-relationship lenders in the post CDS-initiation period. We 
perform our tests for the lead arranger-borrower relationships since lead arrangers perform the 
primary monitoring of the borrower on behalf of syndicate participants.  
4.4.1 Lead Arrangers’ Control Right  
Because lenders retain stronger control rights when they aim to intensively monitor a 
borrower, following prior literature, we measure lenders’ monitoring incentives by the strength of 
their control rights (Roberts and Sufi 2009a, 2009b; Roberts 2015; Kim et al. 2018). Performance 
(income statement-based) covenants act as tripwires and are used primarily to allocate control 
rights to lenders when a borrower underperforms, while capital (balance sheet-based) covenants 
address agency conflicts by aligning ex-ante incentives of a borrower and lenders (Christensen and 
Nikolaev 2012; Christensen et al. 2016). Therefore, the higher (lower) proportion of performance 
covenants should be associated with lenders’ stronger (weaker) control rights. We define 
Performance Covenants as the ratio of the number of performance covenants to the sum of 
performance and capital covenants in a loan contract.11   
                                                
11 In line with Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), we classify cash interest coverage ratio, debt service coverage ratio, 
level of EBITDA, fixed charge coverage ratio, interest coverage ratio, ratio of debt to EBITDA, and ratio of senior 
debt to EBITDA covenants as performance covenants, while quick ratio, current ratio, debt to equity ratio, loan to 
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Roberts and Sufi (2009a) also suggest that performance pricing provisions affect lenders’ 
control rights, by influencing the allocation of bargaining power between a borrower and lenders 
in ex post renegotiations. Performance pricing provisions define a pricing grid, which links a loan’s 
interest rate to a borrower’s performance (Asquith et al. 2005), where the interest rate increases 
(decreases) when a borrower’s performance deteriorates (improves). Because the interest rate 
increasing provision typically imposes a sharp increase in the interest rate when performance 
deteriorates, borrowers are incentivized to renegotiate the loan contract, thus allocating control 
rights to lenders. We define Interest Increasing PP to be equal to 1 if a loan contract contains the 
interest rate increasing performance pricing provisions and 0 otherwise. We measure Interest 
Increasing PP based on the largest loan facility in the package.  
We estimate the following model to examine the effect of CDS initiation on non-
relationship lead arrangers’ control rights.12 
Control Rights = β 0 + β1POST + β2No Relationship-Lead Arranger  
+ β3POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger +β4Assets + β5ROA + 
β6Loss + β7Leverage + β8Interest Coverage + β9Tangibility  
+ β10Rated + β11Investment Grade + β12Amount + β13Maturity  
+ β14Guarantor +  β15PP +  β16#Covenants +  γFixed Effects + ε, 
 
 
 
 
(3)
where Control Rights is either Performance Covenants or Interest Rate Increasing PP, as defined 
above. No Relationship-Lead Arranger and all control variables are defined as previously. If non-
relationship lead arrangers retain weaker control rights post CDS initiation, we expect a negative 
                                                
value ratio, ratio of debt to tangible net worth, leverage ratio, senior leverage ratio, and net worth requirement 
covenants as capital covenants. Financial covenants are identical to all loan facilities in the package.  
12 If loan package has more than one lead arranger (6.5% of sample packages), all lead arrangers are accounted for in 
estimating model (3). Our results are unchanged when we exclude these deals from the analyses.   
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and significant coefficient on the interaction term POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger. For 
covenant specifications, we estimate Model (3) as Tobit (OLS) with firm and year (firm and year-
month) fixed effects. For performance pricing specifications, we estimate Model (3) as Logit 
(OLS) with firm and year (firms and year-month) fixed effects.13 
As we report in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, Table 5, the coefficient on POST × No 
Relationship-Lead Arranger is negative and significant in both specifications for Performance 
Covenants, indicating that non-relationship lead arrangers impose a lower proportion of 
performance covenants following CDS initiation relative to relationship lenders. Economically, in 
the post-CDS initiation period, the proportion of performance covenants is 0.89 times lower when 
non-relationship lead arrangers syndicate a loan relative to when a loan is syndicated by 
relationship lead arrangers. We continue to find negative and significant coefficients on POST × 
No Relationship-Lead Arranger for Interest Rate Increasing PP specifications in column 3 and 4, 
suggesting that CDS-protected non-relationship lead arrangers are less likely to impose provisions 
that would increase the interest rate if a borrower underperforms. In the post-CDS initiation period, 
non-relationship lead arrangers are 0.87 times less likely to impose the interest rate increasing 
performance provisions relative to relationship lead arrangers. To support the robustness of these 
findings, in columns 5 and 6 of Panel A, we perform the analyses for the weighted average Interest 
Rate Increasing PP variable for all facilities in the deal, where weights are based on loan (facility) 
size. We find very similar results.  
Importantly, in contrast to the negative and significant coefficients on POST × No 
Relationship-Lead Arranger, the coefficients on Post, which captures the effect of CDSs on control 
rights of relationship lenders, are insignificant in all specifications. We infer that lead arrangers 
                                                
13  We exclude #Covenants (PP) from the model when we examine performance covenants (interest increasing 
provisions), as it is highly correlated with the dependent variable. 
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that had a prior relationship with the borrower do not relinquish their control rights after CDS 
initiation. This finding helps us understand prior evidence of the detrimental influence of CDSs on 
lenders’ monitoring (e.g., Shan et al. 2015; Chakraborty et al. 2015). We show that weaker lender 
monitoring is actually attributed to lenders that initiate a new relationship with the borrower 
following CDS initiation, while relationship lenders do not reduce their monitoring efforts.  
In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate Model (3) with covenant slack as the dependent 
variable, as covenant tightness also determines lenders’ control rights (e.g., Dichev and Skinner 
2002). Because financial ratios used in covenant definitions are adjusted extensively by lenders 
(e.g., Dichev and Skinner 2002; Li 2016; Li et al. 2016), we focus on the debt-to-EBITDA 
covenant, which slack can be measured reliably based on the DealScan data (e.g., Demerjian and 
Owens 2016). This covenant is also the most frequently used for our sample loans. We measure 
covenant tightness as the difference between a borrower’s debt-to-EBITDA ratio in the year 
preceding the loan issuance measure minus the covenant threshold, divided by standard deviation 
of the debt to EBITDA ratio over the previous 12 quarters (e.g., Dichev and Skinner 2002). We 
find that, following CDS initiations, non-relationship lenders impose looser debt-to-EBITDA 
covenants, as indicated by the positive and significant (albeit at the 10% level) coefficient on POST 
× No Relationship-Lead Arranger. This evidence further suggests that lenders retain weaker 
control rights when entering into new lending relationships following CDS initiation.  
4.4.2 Lead Arrangers’ Share  
Prior studies show that having more skin in the game (i.e., retaining a larger loan share) 
incentivizes the lead arranger to monitor a borrower more intensively (e.g., Sufi 2007; Ball et al. 
2008; Ivashina 2009). Therefore, we supplement the analyses of lenders’ monitoring incentives by 
investigating whether non-relationship lead arrangers retain a lower loan share relative to 
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relationship lenders following CDS initiation.  
Following prior studies (Ball et al. 2008; Ivashina 2009; Amiram et al. 2017), we perform 
these analyses for the largest loan facility in the package and define Lead Arranger Share as the 
proportion of the loan retained by the arranger. We re-estimate Model (3) with Lead Arranger 
Share as the dependent variables and report the results in column 1 of Panel B. Consistent with 
our predictions, we find negative and significant coefficients on POST × No Relationship-Lead 
Arranger. Economically, in the post-CDS initiation period, lead arranger share is 0.92 times lower 
when non-relationship lead arrangers syndicate a loan relative to when a loan is syndicated by 
relationship lead arrangers. To support the robustness of these findings, in column 2 of Panel B, 
we perform the analyses for the weighted average Lead Arranger Share for all facilities in the deal, 
where weights are based on loan (facility) size. We find that our results are unchanged.   
In line with our covenant- and performance-provision-based tests, the analyses presented in 
Panel B also indicate that relationship and non-relationship lenders respond differently to CDS 
initiation. Amiram et al.’s (2017) show that lead arrangers increase their loan share following CDS 
initiation to compensate syndicate participants for the reduction in their monitoring incentives. We 
find that this effect of CDSs is attributed primarily to lenders who had an established relationship 
with the borrower before CDS initiation. In contrast to the negative and significant coefficient on 
POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger, the coefficient on Post, which reflects the effect of CDSs 
on the loan share of relationship lenders, is positive and significant. 
 
4.5 Non-relationship Lender Characteristics 
To better understand the effect of CDS availability on non-relationship lenders’ monitoring 
incentives, we next examine how the characteristics of non-relationship lenders change from the 
pre-CDS initiation period to the post-CDS initiation period. If CDS-protected non-relationship 
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lead arrangers are less committed to intensively monitor the borrower, we predict that there is a 
higher likelihood that lead arrangers with lower monitoring efficiency will initiate lending 
relationships once CDSs on the borrower’s debt become available.  
We examine this prediction using three measures of monitoring efficiency. First, we rely on 
geographical distance between a lender and a borrower. Prior research suggests that greater 
distance impedes the lender’s collection of private, soft information and increases its monitoring 
costs, thus reducing monitoring efficiency (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 2002; Berger et al. 2005; 
Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Sufi 2007; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Dass and Massa 2011). 
Therefore, given the reduced monitoring incentives of CDS-protected non-relationship lead 
arrangers, we predict that, relative to relationship lead arrangers, they are likely to be more distant 
from borrowers in the post- versus the pre-CDS initiation period. For lead arrangers headquartered 
in the US, we measure the distance in miles between a lead arranger’s and a borrower’s 
headquarters (Distance). As an additional measure of lender-borrower distance, we use an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender is not headquartered in US, and 0 otherwise (Foreign). 
We next focus on the lead arranger’s reputation, which reflects its ability and commitment 
to screen and monitor borrowers (e.g., Diamond 1989, 1991; Boot et al. 1993; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri 1994). Lender reputation is especially important in the syndicated loan market, where 
repeated interactions occur between the arranger and the syndicate participants (Dennis and 
Mullineaux 2000; Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Gopalan et al. 2011; Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2012). Following prior literature, we consider reputable arrangers as lenders 
with a strong monitoring ability and incentives. Because CDS-protected non-relationship lead 
arrangers are less likely to rigorously monitor the borrower, we predict that, relative to relationship 
lead arrangers, non-relationship lead arrangers are less likely to be reputable in the post- versus 
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the pre-CDS initiation period. We define Reputation as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a lead 
arranger is one of the top three lead arrangers, based on average market share in the syndicated 
loan market over our sample period, and equals 0 otherwise (Bushman et al. 2010).14 We estimate 
the following model to examine our predictions:  
Lender Characteristics  = β 0 + β1POST + β2No Relationship-Lead Arranger  
+ β3POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger + β4Assets  
+ β5ROA + β6Loss + β7Leverage + β8Interest Coverage  
+ β9Tangibility + β10Rated + β11Investment Grade + β12Amount 
+ β13Maturity + β14Guarantor + γFixed Effects + ε, 
 
 
 
 
(4)
where Lender Characteristics are Distance, Foreign and Reputation, as defined above. No 
Relationship-Lead Arranger and all control variables are defined as previously. We expect a 
positive (negative) and significant coefficient on the interaction term POST × No Relationship-
Lead Arranger in the Distance and Foreign (Reputation) specifications. 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger is 
positive and significant for both lender-borrower distance measures. Economically, relative to 
relationship lead arrangers, non-relationship lead arrangers are 143 miles further away from a 
borrower and are 1.28 times more likely to be foreign in the post- versus the pre-CDS initiation 
period. The coefficient on POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger is negative and significant in 
the Reputation specification. Relative to relationship lead arrangers, non-relationship lead 
arrangers are 0.5 times less likely to be reputable during the post-CDS initiation period.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 indicate that, following CDS initiation, non-relationship lead 
arrangers are more likely to have lower monitoring efficiency, consistent with them being less 
                                                
14 We measure market share based on Bloomberg’s lead-arranger league tables. Our findings are robust if we define 
reputable lead arrangers as the top five or top six rather than the top three.  
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likely to engage in costly monitoring of borrowers.  
 
4.6 Resolving Agency Problems within the Loan Syndicate 
Our findings presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest a stronger adverse effect of CDSs on the 
monitoring incentives of non-relationship relative to relationship lenders. A natural question arises 
of how this weaker monitoring by CDS-protected non-relationship lead arrangers affects the 
structure of loan syndicates. Syndicate participants typically maintain an arm’s-length relationship 
with a borrower and delegate information collection, contractual negotiations, and borrower 
screening and monitoring to the lead arranger. Participants thus face substantial agency issues 
when they join a syndicate (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009). We expect 
greater agency problems within the loan syndicate when it is arranged by a non-relationship 
relative to a relationship lead arranger after CDS initiation. A stronger decline in non-relationship 
lead arrangers’ monitoring incentives should cause syndicate participants to be concerned that 
these arrangers will shirk more on their monitoring duties (e.g., Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009). These 
agency problems can be significantly mitigated if lenders with prior relationships with the 
borrower become syndicate participants, because they have greater knowledge of the borrower’s 
performance and creditworthiness (Sufi 2007). Thus, although we find that non-relationship 
participants are more likely to join the syndicate after CDS initiation (Table 3), we predict that this 
effect will be weaker when a loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead arranger.  
To test this prediction, we augment Model (1) with No Relationship-Lead Arranger and the 
interaction term POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger. If non-relationship participants are less 
likely to join the syndicate in the post-CDS initiation period when the loan is syndicated by non-
relationship lead arrangers relative to when it is syndicated by relationship lead arrangers, we 
expect a negative and significant coefficient on POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger. We 
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report supporting evidence in Table 7. Non-relationship participants are 0.85 times less likely to 
join syndicates arranged by non-relationship lead arrangers. Coupled with the positive and 
significant coefficient on Post, as in previous analyses, these findings indicate that, while non-
relationship lenders are more likely to join the syndicate once CDSs become available, this effect 
is attenuated when a loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead arranger.15  
Agency problems within the syndicate can also be mitigated if participants have a prior 
relationship with the lead arranger (e.g., Sufi 2007; Bushman et al. 2017). In untabulated analyses, 
we examine whether participants familiar with the lead arranger are more likely to join the 
syndicate when the lead arranger initiates a lending relationship following CDS initiation. We find 
no supporting evidence, but this result is generally consistent with Sufi (2007), who shows that, 
when agency problems are severe, previous lead-arranger–participant relationships are much less 
important than the previous relationships between the borrower and the participant. 
 
4.7 Supplementary Analyses  
In this section, we report a number of supplementary analyses. We begin with exploratory 
tests of the effect of CDSs on the interest rate and size of loans syndicated by non-relationship lead 
arrangers. On the one hand, these arrangers may bid aggressively for a loan by offering a low 
spread or more credit. On the other hand, hedging loan exposure via CDSs is costly. If non-
relationship arrangers charge a low spread or have a high loan exposure, the new relationship may 
not be profitable enough to pursue. 
We re-estimate Model (3) with Interest Spread as the dependent variable and report the 
results in column (1) and (2) of Panel A, Table 8. Interest Spread is the interest rate spread on the 
                                                
15 Note that the sum of the coefficients on POST and POST × No Relationship – Lead Arranger is positive and 
significant, suggesting that, even when a loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead arranger, the probability of non-
relationship participants joining the syndicate is higher in the post- relative to the pre-CDS initiation period.  
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largest loan facility in the package. For robustness, we also perform the analyses for the weighted 
average Interest Spread for all facilities in the deal, where weights are based on loan (facility) size. 
The coefficient on the interaction term POST × No Relationship-Lead Arranger is insignificant in 
the interest spread specifications, suggesting that non-relationship lenders do not charge a lower 
spread relative to relationship lenders following CDS initiation. 
In column (3) and (4) of Panel A, we next re-estimate Model (3) with Amount as the 
dependent variables, where Amount is the natural logarithm of the loan amount of the largest 
facility in the loan deal. We also perform analyses for the Deal Amount variable, measured by the 
natural logarithm of loan deal (package) amount. Interestingly, the coefficient on POST × No 
Relationship-Lead Arranger is negative and significant in both loan amount specifications. 
Economically, in the post-CDS initiation period, the size of the largest loan (deal) size is 0.92 
(0.93) times lower when a non-relationship lead arranger syndicates a loan relative to when it is 
syndicated by a relationship lead arranger. This evidence indicates that CDS-protected non-
relationship lead arrangers have lower exposures to new borrowers, which allows them to reduce 
hedging costs via CDSs. Given our findings of a substantial influence of cross-selling potential on 
lead arrangers’ decisions to enter new relationships, we infer that, although these lenders have a 
lower exposure to new borrowers to reduce hedging costs, borrowers still provide them with 
opportunities to serve their additional financial needs.16 
In the next set of analyses, to further illuminate lenders’ incentives to initiate new 
relationships after the onset of CDS trading, we investigate how lenders’ performance affects the 
relation between CDS trading and non-relationship lending. Lenders often cannot expand their 
loan portfolio, because they are restricted by an internal credit risk management policy or face 
                                                
16 We acknowledge that lower deal size may result in lower loan origination fees for lead arrangers, but expect cross-
selling fess to be substantially higher than the decrease in origination fees.   
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regulatory capital constraints. CDS hedging offers lenders more flexible credit risk management 
strategies and alleviate capital constraints (Streitz 2015; Shan et al. 2016). Therefore, we expect 
that lenders experiencing low loan growth will be more likely to extend their loan portfolio and 
seek new borrowers following CDS initiation. We also expect CDS initiation to more strongly 
affect less profitable lenders. When hedging via CDSs and information revelation through CDS 
spreads become available, these lenders are likely to be eager to pursue new relationships to 
enhance their profitability. By expanding loan portfolios, they will benefit from both higher 
interest income and fees from cross-selling additional services to new borrowers.  
To test our predictions, we define an indicator variable Low Loan Growth to be equal to 1 if 
the lender’s average loan growth over the three years before a loan’s issuance is below the sample 
median and 0 otherwise. We augment Model (1) with Low Loan Growth and the interaction term 
POST × Low Loan Growth. We present our findings in Panel B of Table 8 (these analyses are 
restricted for lenders with data available from call reports). Consistent with our predictions, the 
coefficient on POST × Low Loan Growth is positive and significant for both lead arranger and 
participant subsamples. CDS-protected arrangers (participants) are 1.23 (1.29) times more likely 
to initiate non-relationship lending when they experience lower loan growth.  
We further define an indicator variable Low Profitability to be equal to 1 if the lender’s 
average ROE over the three years before a loan’s issuance is below the sample median and 0 
otherwise. We augment Model (1) with Low Profitability and the interaction term POST × Low 
Profitability. As we report in Panel C of Table 8, the coefficient on POST × Low Profitability is 
positive and significant for all specifications, in line with our prediction. Following CDS initiation, 
lead arrangers (participants) are 1.52 (1.49) times more likely to issue loans to new borrowers 
when they experience low profitability. Overall, the results suggest that lenders’ low loan growth 
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and profitability amplify the effect of CDSs on initiating lending relationships for both lead 
arrangers and syndicate participants.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine how the development of the CDS market affects lenders’ incentives to initiate 
new lending relationships. Due to the information advantage of incumbent relationship lenders, 
non-relationship lenders face adverse selection problems when competing for a loan deal, which 
inhibits their relationships with new borrowers (Rajan 1992). We predict that an opportunity to 
hedge against credit losses and the revelation of private information through CDS spreads 
significantly mitigate non-relationship lenders’ adverse selection concerns, increasing their 
willingness to compete for loans to new borrowers. Consistent with our prediction, we find that 
both lead arrangers and syndicate participants are more likely to initiate new relationships once 
CDSs become available. Our findings also highlight the commercialization of the resulting new 
lending relationships. CDS-protected non-relationship lenders enhance the profitability of their 
new relationships by pursuing new borrowers with high cross-selling potential and by reducing 
their own monitoring efforts. Further emphasizing the lower commitment of non-relationship 
lenders to monitoring the borrower once CDSs become available, we find that, relative to 
relationship lenders, non-relationship lenders are likely to be more distant from borrowers, foreign, 
and less reputable in the post-CDS initiation period. We further show that the increase in the 
likelihood of non-relationship participants joining a syndicate following CDS initiation is 
attenuated if the loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead arranger, which mitigates agency 
problems within the syndicate exacerbated by the lower monitoring incentives of non-relationship 
lead arrangers.  
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the influence of the CDS market on private 
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lending by exploring how CDSs affect the formation of new lending relationships and the 
commercialization of these relationships. We further contribute to the expansive literature on 
relationship lending by showing that CDS availability increases the willingness of non-relationship 
lenders to compete for new borrowers and thus enhances competition in the loan market. By 
documenting that a borrower’s cross-selling potential significantly affects lenders’ decisions to 
enter new relationships, we also add to the growing literature on the importance of noncredit 
business opportunities in private lending.   
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable   Definition 
Amount = The natural logarithm of loan amounts of the largest facility in the loan 
package (DealScan). 
Assets = The natural logarithm of total assets, measured in the year preceding a loan’s 
issuance (Compustat).  
CDS Initiation = An indicator variable equal to 1 for the year of CDS initiation, and 0 
otherwise (Markit). 
Deal Amount = The natural logarithm of the package amount (DealScan). 
Distance  = The distance in miles between the lead arranger and the borrower 
(Compustat). 
Forex = The ratio of notional amounts of FX derivatives to the lenders’ total assets, 
measured in the year preceding a loan’s issuance (Call Report). 
Foreign = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a lead arranger is not headquartered in US
and 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
,Guarantor = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is guaranteed, and 0 otherwise 
(DealScan). 
High-CS Potential-Derivatives = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the ratio of derivative-related word count 
to total word count in the 10-K filing in the year preceding a loan’s issuance 
is greater than the sample median, and 0 otherwise (10-K). 
High-CS Potential-Foreign = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the ratio of the number of a borrower’s 
foreign operating segments to its total number of operating segments in the 
year preceding a loan’s issuance is greater than the sample median, and 0 
otherwise (Compustat). 
High-CS Potential-Industry = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a  borrower is in the aviation, shipbuilding, 
oil, refinery, gas, or telecommunication industries, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
High-CS Potential-M&A = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower engages in M&A deals within 
3 years after a loan’s issuance, and 0 otherwise (SDC). 
High-CS Potential-Media = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a media covers topics related to cross-
selling opportunities (e.g., public offering, merger, acquisition, and 
investment) within 3 years before a loan’s issuance, and 0 otherwise 
(RavenPack). 
Interest Coverage = The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest expense, measured 
in the year preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
Interest Spread  = The natural logarithm of the all-in-drawn spread of the largest facility in the 
package (DealScan). 
Interest Spread  
(weighted average) 
= The natural logarithm of the weighted average all-in-drawn spread for all 
facilities in the deal, where weights are based on loan (facility) size 
(DealScan). 
Interest Rate Increase PP = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan contains an interest rate increasing 
performance-pricing provision, and 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
Investment Grade = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has an investment-grade rating in 
the year prior to a loan’s issuance, and 0 otherwise (Compustat, Mergent 
FISD).  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Variable   Definition 
Last Loan = An indicator variable equal to 1 for the last loan issued prior to a  borrower's 
CDS initiation date, and 0 otherwise (DealScan, Markit). 
Lead Arranger Share = The proportion (%) of the loan retained by the lead arranger, measured for 
the largest facility in the loan package (DealScan). 
Lead Arranger Share 
(weighted average) 
= The weighted average lead arranger share variable for all facilities in the deal, 
where weights are based on loan (facility) size (DealScan). 
Leverage = The ratio of total liabilities to total assets, measured in the year preceding a 
loan’s issuance (Compustat).  
Loss = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a borrower’s net income in the year 
preceding a loan’s issuance is less than 0, and 0 otherwise (Compustat). 
Low Coverage = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of equity analysts following 
the borrower in the year of a loan’s issuance is less than the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise (I/B/E/S). 
Low Loan Growth = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender's average loan growth over the 
3-year period prior to a loan’s issuance is below the sample median, and 0 
otherwise (Call Report). 
Low ROE = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender's average ROE over the 3-year 
period prior to the loan issuance is below the sample median, and 0  otherwise 
(Call Report). 
Maturity = The maturity of a loan in months (DealScan). 
MTB = The market value divided by the book value of equity, measured in the year 
prior to the year under consideration (Compustat).   
No Relationship - Lead Arranger = For lead arrangers that syndicate loans to CDS firms, an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the lead arranger has not syndicated a borrower’s loans prior to 
the CDS initiation date, and 0 otherwise. For lead arrangers that syndicate 
loans to non-CDS firms, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger 
has not syndicated a borrower’s loans prior to the issuance date of the loan 
under consideration, and 0 otherwise (DealScan, Markit). 
No Relationship - Participant  = For syndicate participants in loans to CDS firms, an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the participant has not participated in a borrower’s loans prior to the 
CDS initiation date, and 0 otherwise. For syndicate participants in loans to 
non-CDS firms, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not
participated in a borrower’s loans prior to the issuance date of the loan under 
consideration, and 0 otherwise (DealScan, Markit).  
Performance Covenants = The ratio of the number of performance covenants divided by the sum of 
performance and capital covenants in a loan contract (DealScan). 
POST = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is issued after the CDS trading 
initiation date, and 0 otherwise (Markit). 
PP = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan has a performance pricing 
provision, and 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
Profit Margin = The ratio of net income to sales, measured in the year prior to the year under 
consideration (Compustat).  
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
 
Variable   Definition 
Rated = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is rated by S&P or Moody's in the 
year prior to a loan’s issuance, and 0 otherwise (Compustat, Mergent FISD). 
Reputation = An indicator variable equal to 1 if a lead arranger is one of the top 3 lead 
arrangers by the average market share over the sample period), and 0 
otherwise (DealScan, Bloomberg).  
Return Volatility = The standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock return, measured in the 
year prior to the year under consideration (Compustat, CRSP). 
ROA = The ratio of net income to total assets (Compustat). 
Tangibility = The ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets (Compustat). 
#Covenants = The total number of financial covenants (DealScan). 
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Appendix B 
Additional Analyses 
 
TABLE B1 
Borrower Information Opacity 
 
This table examines whether the effect of CDS trading on non-relationship lending is more pronounced for more 
opaque borrowers. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the analysis for the lead arranger (participant) specifications.  
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) present results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and year (year-month) fixed 
effects in the logit (OLS) model. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship 
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.534*** 0.092***  0.499*** 0.112*** 
 (3.86) (3.57)  (6.84) (7.09) 
Low Coverage -0.179** -0.035**  -0.055 -0.012 
 (-2.43) (-2.33)  (-0.88) (-0.94) 
POST*Low Coverage 0.338** 0.079***  0.092 0.018 
  (2.30) (2.82)  (1.16) (1.06) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
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TABLE B2 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
This table presents the propensity score matching (PSM) analyses. Panel A provides results of the first-stage probit 
model of CDS initiation. Panel B reports the difference in the means of the explanatory variables between the CDS 
firms and matched non-CDS firms to provide evidence of covariate balancing in the PSM estimation. t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: First-stage CDS Initiation Probit Model 
CDS Initiation  
Rated 0.848*** 
 (13.46) 
Investment Grade 0.362*** 
 (6.39) 
Assets 0.107*** 
 (5.44) 
Leverage -0.019 
 (-0.20) 
Profit Margin -0.002*** 
 (-3.03) 
Return Volatility 0.075 
 (1.14) 
MTB 0.004 
  (0.96) 
Model Probit 
Observations 27,553 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.192 
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TABLE B2 (continued) 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
Panel B: Covariate Balancing 
  Means Difference in means 
CDS firms non-CDS firms (t-stats) 
Rated 0.910 0.901  0.009 
    (0.54) 
Investment Grade 0.565 0.587  (0.022) 
    (-0.85) 
Assets 8.407 8.283  0.124* 
    (1.77) 
Leverage 0.647 0.651  (0.004) 
    (-0.41) 
Profit Margin (1.446) (0.003)  (1.443) 
    (-0.98) 
Return Volatility 0.043 0.041  0.002 
    (0.14) 
MTB 3.020 3.090  (0.070) 
     (-0.30) 
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TABLE B3 
Industries with High Cross-selling Potential  
 
This table presents SIC codes of industries we classify as having high cross-selling potential. 
 
Industry  SIC code SIC industry name 
 
Oil, Refinery and Gas 
1311 CRUDE PETROLEUM & NATURAL GAS 
1381 DRILLING OIL & GAS WELLS 
1382 OIL & GAS FIELD EXPLORATION SERVICES 
1389 OIL & GAS FIELD SERVICES, NEC 
2911 PETROLEUM REFINING 
4922 NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION 
4923 NATURAL GAS TRANSMISISON & DISTRIBUTION 
4924 NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION 
Aviation  
3720 AIRCRAFT & PARTS 
3721 AIRCRAFT 
3724 AIRCRAFT ENGINES & ENGINE PARTS 
3728 AIRCRAFT PARTS & AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT, NEC 
4512 AIR TRANSPORTATION, SCHEDULED 
4522 AIR TRANSPORTATION, NONSCHEDULED 
Telecommunication  4813 TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS 
Shipbuilding  3730 SHIP & BOAT BUILDING & REPAIRING 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the lead arranger and participant samples. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
  Lead arranger sample Participant sample  
N Mean Median SD  N Mean Median SD 
No Relationship 27,457 0.38 0.00 0.49  177,936 0.44 0.00 0.50 
Assets 27,457 7.79 7.70 2.06  177,936 8.28 8.20 1.69 
ROA 27,457 0.03 0.04 0.09  177,936 0.03 0.04 0.07 
Loss 27,457 0.21 0.00 0.41  177,936 0.16 0.00 0.37 
Leverage 27,457 0.64 0.63 0.23  177,936 0.66 0.65 0.21 
Interest Coverage 27,457 11.02 3.55 26.81  177,936 9.65 3.79 22.36 
Tangibility 27,457 0.60 0.56 0.40  177,936 0.59 0.55 0.40 
Rated 27,457 0.58 0.00 0.49  177,936 0.72 1.00 0.45 
Investment Grade 27,457 0.33 1.00 0.47  177,936 0.42 1.00 0.49 
Amount 27,457 19.47 0.00 1.54  177,936 20.06 0.00 1.14 
Maturity 27,457 46.69 19.52 25.65  177,936 48.33 20.03 23.40 
Guarantor 27,457 0.10 55.00 0.30  177,936 0.11 60.00 0.31 
PP 27,457 0.42 1.00 0.49  177,936 0.57 1.00 0.50 
#Covenants 27,457 1.14 0.00 1.31  177,936 1.38 0.00 1.32 
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TABLE 2 
The Effect of CDS Trading on Non-relationship Lending 
 
This table examines the effect of CDSs on non-relationship lending. Panel A reports results of the primary tests. Panel 
B reports results of the analysis that investigates whether the parallel trend assumption holds for our tests. Panel C 
reports results for the short-window analysis, in which observations of CDS firms are limited to 3 years before and 
after CDS initiation. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the analysis for the lead arranger (participant) specifications. 
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) present results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and year (year-month) fixed 
effects in the logit (OLS) model. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
 
Panel A:  Primary Tests 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.778*** 0.149***  0.563*** 0.125*** 
 (8.12) (8.46)  (10.79) (11.39) 
Assets 0.011 0.003  -0.180*** -0.037*** 
 (0.22) (0.31)  (-4.98) (-4.94) 
ROA -0.053 -0.002  0.049 0.007 
 (-0.16) (-0.03)  (0.17) (0.11) 
Loss 0.077 0.021  0.016 0.002 
 (1.19) (1.58)  (0.31) (0.21) 
Leverage -0.263* -0.054*  -0.206* -0.039 
 (-1.81) (-1.87)  (-1.70) (-1.50) 
Interest Coverage 0.000 0.000  0.001* 0.000** 
 (-0.24) (-0.37)  (1.86) (2.00) 
Tangibility 0.505*** 0.103***  0.019 0.009 
 (3.02) (3.18)  (0.17) (0.38) 
Rated -0.014 0.000  0.032 0.006 
 (-0.18) (0.01)  (0.53) (0.47) 
Investment Grade 0.023 0.007  -0.128** -0.027** 
 (0.24) (0.39)  (-2.37) (-2.37) 
Amount -0.157*** -0.033***  0.041* 0.008* 
 (-5.42) (-5.92)  (1.81) (1.69) 
Maturity 0.008*** 0.002***  0.010*** 0.002*** 
 (8.10) (8.80)  (14.12) (14.40) 
Guarantor 0.230*** 0.047***  0.243*** 0.052*** 
 (3.29) (3.40)  (5.12) (5.19) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
  
53 
 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
The Effect of CDS Trading on Non-relationship Lending 
 
Panel B: Pre-trend Analyses 
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship 
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Last Loan -0.151 -0.029  -0.031 -0.002 
 (-1.18) (-1.33)  (-0.47) (-0.13) 
POST 0.727*** 0.138***  0.551*** 0.124*** 
 (7.06) (7.20)  (9.40) (9.95) 
Model Logit OLS Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196 175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181 0.015 0.145 
 
Panel C: Short-window Analyses 
 
No Relationship 
 - Lead Arranger 
No Relationship 
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.354*** 0.073***  0.249*** 0.050*** 
 (3.18) (3.63)  (4.18) (4.18) 
Model Logit OLS Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes No Yes 
Observations 18,377 21,423 129,685 131,879 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.025 0.145 0.018 0.161 
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TABLE 3 
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
  
This table presents results of the analysis to address endogeneity concerns. Panel A reports results based on propensity 
score matching (PSM) analysis using the full sample. Panel B reports results of PSM analysis using a short-window 
sample, which limit observations to 3 years before and after the CDS initiation date (the pseudo-CDS initiation date 
for non-CDS firms). In Panels A and Panel B, Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the analysis for the lead arranger 
(participant) specifications. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) present results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and 
year (year-month) fixed effects in the logit (OLS) model. Panel C presents results of the second-stage instrumental 
variable (IV) regression analyses, estimated simultaneously with the first-stage CDS initiation model. Column 1 (2) 
reports the IV regression analysis for the lead arranger (participant) specification. We include firm and year fixed 
effects in the model. Across all models, t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: PSM Analyses—Full Sample 
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST -0.102 -0.014  -0.221*** -0.042*** 
 (-0.85) (-0.72)  (-3.27 ) (-3.30) 
POST*CDS Traded 0.367** 0.074***  0.266*** 0.060*** 
  (2.13) (2.64)  (2.83) (3.36) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 16,366 17,284  143,972 144,533 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.100 0.295  0.130 0.172 
 
Panel B:  PSM Analyses—Short Window 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST -0.069 -0.014  -0.205*** -0.034*** 
 (-0.47) (-0.62)  (-3.00) (-2.66) 
POST*CDS Traded 0.335* 0.064**  0.203** 0.046** 
  (1.66) (1.99)  (2.07) (2.38) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 6,476 7,875  68,340 68,954 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.040 0.275  0.011 0.158 
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Panel C: Instrumental Variable (IV) Analyses 
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship 
- Participant 
(1) (2) 
POST 1.209**  10.114*** 
 (2.11)  (4.19) 
Assets -0.040  -0.393** 
 (-1.62)  (-2.15) 
ROA -0.025  -0.366 
 (-0.17)  (-0.41) 
Loss 0.000  0.032 
 (-0.01)  (0.20) 
Leverage -0.052  -1.276** 
 (-0.65)  (-2.39) 
Interest Coverage 0.000  0.006** 
 (0.63)  (2.42) 
Tangibility 0.223*  1.420** 
 (1.77)  (2.43) 
Rated -0.023  0.132 
 (-0.51)  (0.56) 
Investment Grade -0.059  -0.497* 
 (-1.31)  (-1.90) 
Amount -0.022**  0.034 
 (-2.09)  (0.46) 
Maturity 0.001  -0.006* 
 (1.44)  (-1.91) 
Guarantor 0.031  0.095 
 (1.25)  (0.69) 
Model OLS  OLS 
Firm FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations Yes  Yes 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 8,483  33,759 
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TABLE 4 
Borrower Cross-selling Potential 
  
This table examines whether the effect of CDS trading on non-relationship lending is more pronounced when a 
borrower has high cross-selling potential. Panels A, B, C, D, and E  report results of the analyses in which cross-
selling potential is measured based on media coverage of public offerings, mergers, acquisitions, and investment topics 
in borrower-specific articles preceding a loan’s issuance (High CS Potential-Media), a borrower’s M&A transactions 
following a loan’s issuance (High CS Potential-M&A), a borrower’s participation in the aviation, shipbuilding, oil, 
refinery, gas, or telecommunication industries (High CS Potential-Industry), a borrower’s demand for derivative-
related products (High CS Potential-Derivatives), and the extent of a borrower’s foreign operations (High CS 
Potential-Foreign), respectively. In all panels, Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the analyses for the lead arranger 
(participant) specifications. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) present results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and 
year (year-month) fixed effects in the logit (OLS) model. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Media Coverage 
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.737*** 0.135***  0.398*** 0.088*** 
 (5.71) (5.83)  (6.15) (6.54) 
High CS Potential-Media  -0.066 -0.010  0.089* 0.016* 
 (-0.95) (-0.79)  (1.99) (1.74) 
POST*High CS Potential-Media  0.250** 0.047**  -0.071 -0.010 
  (2.03) (2.12)  (-1.18) (-0.81) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 19,025 22,148  141,898 143,912 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.027 0.219  0.012 0.151 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Borrower Cross-selling Potential 
 
Panel B: Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.756*** 0.145***  0.572*** 0.127*** 
 (7.84) (8.16)  (10.94) (11.52) 
High CS Potential-M&A -0.152 -0.025  0.118 0.025 
 (-1.38) (-1.31)  (1.56) (1.64) 
POST* High CS Potential-M&A 0.489** 0.087**  -0.142 -0.034 
  (2.13) (2.10)  (-1.03) (-1.13) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
 
Panel C: Industry Type 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.706*** 0.136***  0.538*** 0.119*** 
 (7.10) (7.34)  (9.83) (10.42) 
POST*High CS Potential-Industry 0.520** 0.089**  0.173 0.042 
 (2.11) (2.03)  (1.37) (1.51) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Borrower Cross-selling Potential 
 
Panel D: Derivative Transactions  
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.597*** 0.115***  0.395*** 0.089*** 
 (4.81) (4.94)  (5.73) (6.02) 
High CS Potential-Derivatives -0.027 -0.006  -0.014 -0.004 
 (-0.45) (-0.50)  (-0.34) (-0.43) 
POST*High CS Potential-Derivatives 0.298** 0.055**  0.253*** 0.054*** 
  (2.38) (2.31)  (3.78) (3.75) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
 
Panel E: Foreign Operations 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.667*** 0.128***  0.512*** 0.114*** 
 (6.21) (6.29)  (9.17) (9.55) 
High CS Potential-Foreign -0.107 -0.025*  -0.045 -0.009 
 (-1.46) (-1.77)  (-0.91) (-0.88) 
POST*High CS Potential-Foreign 0.295** 0.056**  0.153** 0.034** 
  (2.07) (2.12)  (2.01) (2.09) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 24,582 27,196  175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.029 0.181  0.015 0.145 
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TABLE 5 
 Non-relationship Lead Arrangers’ Monitoring Incentives  
 
This table presents results of the analyses that examine non-relationship lead arrangers’ monitoring incentives 
following CDS initiation. In Panel A, we measure monitoring incentives by the strength of lead arranger’s control 
rights: in Columns (1) and (2) we examine the proportion of performance covenants in the total of performance and 
capital covenants (Performance Covenants) and, in Columns (3) – (6), the existence of the interest-rate-increasing 
pricing provision (Interest Rate Increasing PP). In Panel B, we measure monitoring incentives by the share retained 
by the lead arranger (Lead Arranger Share). We include firm and year (year-month) fixed effects in logit and Tobit 
(OLS) models. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Non-relationship Lead Arrangers’ Monitoring Incentives  
 
Panel A: Lead Arrangers' Control Rights 
  Performance Covenants Interest Rate Increasing PP  
Interest Rate Increasing PP 
(weighted average) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
POST 0.081* -0.009  0.091 0.015  0.050 0.013 
 (1.88) (-0.65)  (0.82) (0.89)  (0.45) (0.81) 
No Relationship -0.004 -0.003  0.008 0.000  0.052 0.002 
 - Lead Arranger (-0.16) (-0.49)  (0.15) (-0.07)  (0.99) (0.33) 
POST*No Relationship  -0.263*** -0.041***  -0.251** -0.039**  -0.238** -0.039** 
- Lead Arranger (-4.98) (-2.98)  (-2.16) (-2.37)  (-2.06) (-2.42) 
Assets -0.280*** -0.014*  -0.135** -0.015*  -0.114* -0.014 
 (-19.76) (-1.94)  (-2.13) (-1.72)  (-1.80) (-1.64) 
ROA -0.077 -0.028  -0.767 -0.055  -0.581 -0.047 
 (-0.46) (-0.53)  (-1.53) (-0.82)  (-1.15) (-0.71) 
Loss 0.163*** 0.026**  -0.258*** -0.030**  -0.251*** -0.031*** 
 (4.67) (2.30)  (-2.93) (-2.45)  (-2.88) (-2.59) 
Leverage 0.361*** 0.034  -1.502*** -0.173***  -1.474*** -0.172*** 
 (6.13) (1.38)  (-7.01) (-6.37)  (-6.98) (-6.42) 
Interest Coverage 0.002*** 0.000*  -0.001 0.000  -0.001 0.000 
 (5.17) (1.88)  (-0.80) (-0.75)  (-0.56) (-0.62) 
Tangibility -0.351*** -0.007  0.030 -0.003  0.102 0.001 
 (-8.88) (-0.29)  (0.16) (-0.10)  (0.54) (0.04) 
Rated 0.221*** 0.008  0.092 0.020  0.044 0.018 
 (6.48) (0.66)  (0.84) (1.28)  (0.41) (1.21) 
Investment Grade -0.438*** -0.031**  0.415*** 0.072***  0.403*** 0.069*** 
 (-10.80) (-2.04)  (3.99) (4.09)  (3.88) (4.02) 
Amount 0.115*** 0.022***  0.448*** 0.056***  0.495*** 0.056*** 
 (8.76) (5.54)  (11.36) (12.05)  (12.17) (12.38) 
Maturity 0.004*** 0.001***  0.002 0.000  0.002 0.000 
 (8.15) (4.37)  (0.90) (1.63)  (1.13) (1.37) 
Guarantor 0.681*** 0.158***  0.382*** 0.056***  0.414*** 0.056*** 
 (19.47) (11.64)  (4.35) (4.01)  (4.74) (4.13) 
PP 1.388*** 0.310***       
 (54.22) (36.74)       
#Covenants    0.740*** 0.109***  0.768*** 0.109*** 
     (27.11) (30.32)  (28.44) (31.00) 
Model Tobit OLS  Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 27,457 27,196  20,819 27,196  21,159 27,196 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ N/A 0.517  0.164 0.298  0.180 0.307 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
Non-relationship Lead Arranger’ Monitoring Incentives 
 
Panel B:  Lead Arrangers’ “Skin in the Game” 
  Lead Arranger Share 
Lead Arranger Share  
(weighted average) 
(1) (2) 
POST 3.449***  5.018*** 
 (3.63)  (5.26) 
No Relationship  3.784***  2.871*** 
- Lead Arranger (6.59)  (4.51) 
POST*No Relationship  -3.334***  -3.532*** 
- Lead Arranger (-2.96)  (-3.29) 
Assets -2.103***  -1.882** 
 (-3.12)  (-2.58) 
ROA 1.359  0.880 
 (0.22)  (0.13) 
Loss 3.246***  2.552** 
 (3.47)  (2.49) 
Leverage 0.169  1.122 
 (0.06)  (0.40) 
Interest Coverage 0.024*  0.033** 
 (1.72)  (2.06) 
Tangibility -1.374  -1.880 
 (-0.64)  (-0.86) 
Rated 0.884  2.337* 
 (0.71)  (1.86) 
Investment Grade 0.862  1.977* 
 (0.77)  (1.79) 
Amount -10.094***  -9.967*** 
 (-19.08)  (-16.10) 
Maturity -0.098***  -0.096*** 
 (-6.20)  (-5.76) 
Guarantor 1.128  0.760 
 (1.28)  (0.84) 
PP -6.405***  -5.318*** 
 (-8.29)  (-6.35) 
#Covenants -0.230  -0.841** 
  (-0.67)  (-2.22) 
Model OLS  OLS 
Firm FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE No  No 
Year-month FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 8,398  8,398 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.718  0.659 
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TABLE 6 
 Non-relationship Lead Arrangers’ Characteristics 
 
This table presents results of the analyses that examine non-relationship lead arranger characteristics following CDS 
initiation. In Columns (1) and (2), we examine whether the non-relationship lead arranger is more likely to be foreign 
(Foreign). In Column (3), we examine the distance (Distance) between the borrower and the lead arranger. In Columns 
(4) and (5), we examine whether the non-relationship lead arranger is more likely to be reputable (Reputation) We 
include firm and year (year-month) fixed effects in the logit and OLS models. t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  Foreign Distance Reputation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POST -0.160 -0.026**  -59.583***  0.011 0.008 
 (-1.08) (-2.06)  (-3.51)  (0.09) (0.52) 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
0.814*** 
(11.23) 
0.075*** 
(10.92) 
 
12.172 
(1.09) 
 
-0.317*** 
(-5.35) 
-0.034*** 
(-4.93) 
POST*No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
0.388** 
(2.00) 
0.069*** 
(3.21) 
 
143.067*** 
(4.34) 
 
-0.346* 
(-1.78) 
-0.051** 
(-2.05) 
Assets 0.264*** 0.033***  10.839  0.190*** 0.015** 
 (3.86) (5.05)  (0.95)  (2.87) (2.08) 
ROA 0.603 0.062  -91.424  0.305 0.031 
 (1.30) (1.61)  (-1.07)  (0.72) (0.61) 
Loss -0.072 -0.009  8.443  0.004 0.000 
 (-0.72) (-0.97)  (0.57)  (0.05) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.157 0.019  31.960  -0.250 -0.029 
 (0.75) (1.04)  (0.90)  (-1.12) (-1.16) 
Interest Coverage -0.001 0.000  -0.168  0.000 0.000 
 (-0.75) (-1.21)  (-0.81)  (0.20) (-0.13) 
Tangibility -0.345* -0.022  -45.302  0.350 0.023 
 (-1.65) (-1.14)  (-1.31)  (1.59) (0.96) 
Rated -0.018 -0.001  -30.878  0.160 0.016 
 (-0.14) (-0.13)  (-1.57)  (1.41) (1.25) 
Investment Grade -0.185 -0.016  3.469  0.010 0.002 
 (-1.43) (-1.26)  (0.19)  (0.08) (0.15) 
Amount -0.192*** -0.024***  -7.003  0.046 0.006 
 (-4.29) (-4.83)  (-1.05)  (1.17) (1.39) 
Maturity 0.010*** 0.001***  0.493**  -0.005*** -0.000*** 
 (6.75) (5.87)  (2.57)  (-3.68) (-3.22) 
Guarantor 0.257** 0.021*  -12.489  0.037 0.003 
 (2.11) (1.85)  (-0.67)  (0.41) (0.30) 
Model Logit OLS OLS Logit OLS 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  No  Yes No 
Year-Month FE No Yes  Yes  No Yes 
Observations 13,541 27,196  16,222  17,056 27,196 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.062 0.505 0.735  0.043  0.405 
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TABLE 7 
 Agency Problems within the Syndicate 
 
This table presents results of the analyses that investigate how agency problems within the syndicate are mitigated 
following CDS initiation. Column 1 (2) presents results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and year (year-
month) fixed effects in the logit (OLS) model. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
No Relationship - Participant 
(1) (2) 
POST 0.559*** 0.120*** 
 (10.12) (10.46) 
No Relationship - Lead Arranger 0.745*** 0.161*** 
 (21.24) (21.42) 
POST*No Relationship - Lead Arranger -0.343*** -0.068*** 
  (-5.57) (-5.07) 
Model Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes 
Observations 175,677 177,815 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.025 0.154 
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TABLE 8 
Supplementary Analyses 
 
This table presents results of the supplementary analyses. Panel A examines the effect of CDSs on the interest spread 
and size of loans syndicated by non-relationship lead arrangers. In Columns (1) and (2), we examine the interest spread 
(Interest Spread) and in Columns (3) and (4), we examine the size of a loan (Amount, Deal Amount). Analyses include 
firm and year-month fixed effects. Panels B and C examine whether the effect of CDS trading on non-relationship 
lending is more pronounced for lenders with low loan growth (Low Loan Growth) and low profitability (Low 
Profitability), respectively. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) report the analyses for the lead arranger (participant) 
specifications. Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) present results using a logit (OLS) model. We include firm and year (year-
month) fixed effects in the logit (OLS) model. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A: Interest Spread and Loan Amount 
  Loan Spread 
Loan Spread  
(weighted average) Amount  Deal Amount 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
POST 0.040  0.038  -0.030  -0.043 
 (1.55)  (1.49)  (-0.92)  (-1.26) 
No Relationship  0.059***  0.058***  -0.058***  -0.038** 
- Lead Arranger (5.81)  (5.75)  (-3.84)  (-2.41) 
POST*No Relationship  -0.020  -0.019  -0.084**  -0.077* 
- Lead Arranger (-0.81)  (-0.79)  (-2.19)  (-1.95) 
Assets -0.111***  -0.112***  0.462***  0.479*** 
 (-8.72)  (-8.76)  (18.47)  (18.95) 
ROA -0.468***  -0.454***  0.408**  0.441*** 
 (-4.96)  (-4.97)  (2.49)  (2.59) 
Loss 0.164***  0.164***  -0.077***  -0.070** 
 (8.02)  (8.03)  (-2.66)  (-2.36) 
Leverage 0.313***  0.316***  0.020  0.081 
 (8.48)  (8.50)  (0.28)  (1.10) 
Interest Coverage -0.001***  -0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
 (-6.83)  (-6.96)  (2.61)  (2.89) 
Tangibility -0.309***  -0.311***  -0.015  -0.003 
 (-6.89)  (-7.09)  (-0.20)  (-0.03) 
Rated 0.040*  0.037*  -0.100***  -0.109*** 
 (1.77)  (1.67)  (-3.61)  (-3.75) 
Investment Grade -0.203***  -0.194***  0.029  -0.001 
 (-6.00)  (-6.20)  (0.76)  (-0.03) 
Amount -0.060***  -0.057***     
 (-6.46)  (-6.16)     
Maturity 0.000  0.000  0.004***  0.005*** 
 (1.19)  (1.28)  (6.90)  (8.73) 
Guarantor 0.013  0.017  -0.066**  -0.072** 
  (0.79)  (0.99)  (-2.36)  (-2.40) 
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Table 8 Panel A (continued) 
PP -0.102***  -0.102***  0.214***  0.197*** 
 (-7.10)  (-7.65)  (11.40)  (10.38) 
#Covenants 0.055*** 0.055***  0.031***  0.059*** 
  (11.09) (11.25)  (4.34)  (7.75) 
Model OLS OLS  OLS  OLS 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE No No  No  No 
Year-month FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 27,196 27,196  27,196  27,196 
Adj. (Pseudo) ) ܴଶ 0.756 0.76  0.790  0.774 
 
Panel B: Lender Loan Growth 
 
No Relationship  
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship  
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST 0.181 0.043  0.374*** 0.066*** 
 (1.00) (1.61)  (4.31) (4.53) 
Low Loan Growth -0.408*** -0.062***  -0.362*** -0.062*** 
 (-4.32) (-4.45)  (-9.71) (-10.08) 
POST*Low Loan Growth 0.382** 0.059**  0.464*** 0.080*** 
  (2.03) (2.23)  (6.79) (6.67) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 6,149 9,333  34,909 36,589 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.043 0.382  0.035 0.215 
 
Panel C: Lender Profitability 
 
No Relationship 
- Lead Arranger 
No Relationship 
- Participant 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST -0.139 0.001  0.170* 0.040*** 
 (-0.61) (0.04)  (1.80) (2.78) 
Low Profitability 0.038 0.015  0.043 0.008 
 (0.41) (0.98)  (1.14) (1.20) 
POST*Low Profitability 0.912*** 0.134***  0.812*** 0.136*** 
  (3.57) (3.66)  (9.42) (9.52) 
Model Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No  Yes No 
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Year-month FE No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 6,149 9,333  34,909 36,589 
Adj. (Pseudo) ܴଶ 0.044 0.176  0.038 0.150 
 
